This paper considers an economy with a public good where a decision must be made both about the level of the public good and the taxation imposed on each citizen (multi-dimensional policy space). In this context, we derive two results: i) we show that a Nash equilibrium exists under deterministic voting, ii) we show that political competition is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the elimination of political rents (efficiency). In our political game a Nash equilibrium (under deterministic voting) exists because politicians commit to the level of the public good but not to the level of taxation. Furthermore, we show that efficiency requires appropriate political institutions (maximum taxation constraint). These results are interesting, because they show that i) partial commitment is an important element of the efficient solution of this problem, ii) to the best of our knowledge, this is the only game with multi-dimensional policy space, where an equilibrium exists, it is efficient and political rents are zero.
Introduction
In economies with public goods, competitive markets provide suboptimal allocation of resources, a problem which economists have acknowledged since the writings of Wicksell (1896) and Lindahl (1919) 1 . Due to this, as Samuelson (1954 Samuelson ( , 1955 has pointed out, centralized decision making processes are required in such environments in order to solve the problem of externalities and restore Pareto efficiency. However, since a benevolent social planner does not exist, centralized decisions can be manipulated by those in power in order to extract economic rents for themselves (Buchanan, 1959) and hence centralization does not necessarily improve the welfare of all agents involved in this process.
Many economists (see for example Stigler, 1972 and Wittman, 1989) have argued that the extraction of economic rents by politicians is minimized by the existence of political competition. As the forces of economic competition among firms eliminate monopoly power and profits, so does political competition reduce the power of a single politician and the part of the surplus he can extract from citizens. This argument is very powerful and intuitive, nevertheless it has not been presented in a formal manner so far.
However, the formal modeling of political competition in a multi-dimensional policy setting has to address the issue of the existence of a (Nash) equilibrium. It is well known that voting games in multi-dimensional settings, under deterministic voting, have a Nash equilibrium under extremely restrictive conditions on preferences 2 . In order to overcome this problem, many authors have introduced probabilistic voting (see for example Hinich (1977) , Kramer (1978) , Coughlin and Nitzan (1981) ). In these models, citizens vote randomly according to probability functions based on their preferences and politicians maximize expected votes.
In a sense, probabilistic models introduce a friction (uncertainty) in order to achieve equilibrium. Furthermore, even with probabilistic voting, a Nash equilibrium may not exist under reasonable conditions 3 . In contrast, in this paper we show how a Nash equilibrium always exists in a frictionless world (apart from the externality generated by the public good) under fully deterministic voting. The key to this result is that politicians commit only to the level of the public good but not to the taxation they will impose on each individual. As we have mentioned above, when political proposals are committing in all dimensions then no Nash equilibrium exists. The downside of our approach is that, because of the lack of commitment to the taxation level, politicians are able to overtax citizens and extract rents (inefficiency), even under political competition. Therefore, the achievement of efficiency requires appropriate political institutions (maximum taxation constraint).
1 Translated versions of the writings of these authors and presentations of their ideas can be found in Musgrave, 1959 , Johansen, 1963 and Escarraz, 1967 2 For an extensive analysis of this issue see, for example, Plott (1967) , Kramer (1973) and Slutsky (1979) 3 See, for example, Feldman and Lee (1988) , Usher (1994) and Kirchgässner (2000) Hence, the second point we make in this paper is that political competition is a necessary, but not sufficient condition, for the elimination of political rents. More specifically, we consider a two-agent economy with one private and one public good. In this economy political parties (essentially politicians) are exogenous entities, which propose levels of public good but they do not commit to the level of taxation they will impose on each individual and seek to be elected. Agents vote for the proposal they prefer and the party that wins the election receives the power to levy taxation on agents and implement its proposal. The winning party can choose to impose any taxation level on agents, as long as the willingness-to-pay of any agent is not violated for the level of public good to be produced. Because in our context politicians are exogenous entities, political rents imply an inefficiently low level of the public good. In other words, the efficient provision of the public good requires the elimination of political rents.
We consider three different cases. First, we assume that the maximum-taxation restriction holds, but there is only a single political party in the economy. We then show that the party acts as a social dictator and chooses a very low level of public good (compared to the first best level), such that it maximizes its political rents given the maximum willingness-to-pay constraint of agents. Therefore, without political competition, political rents and inefficiency arise.
Next, we allow for political competition between two parties, but we remove the constraint on maximum taxation. The constraint, now, the politicians face in choosing the taxation level is the participation constraint of the agents. In this case, we show that, despite the presence of competition, political rents and inefficiency arise again, because of the weak political institutions. Without the appropriate form of protection against over-taxation from the government, agents are indifferent between political parties, because they understand that irrespectively of how they vote, they will end up in their participation constraint. Understanding this, politicians realize that political competition does not reduce their power to extract social surplus and hence make proposals which maximize their rents. This is an important result, because it shows that political competition, on its own, is not sufficient for the elimination of political rents. Other political institutions are also required (like restrictions on the maximum taxation) for the restoration of efficiency.
Finally, we examine the case where both political competition and the taxation constraint restrict the power of politicians. We show that the combination of these two restrictions eliminate political rents and force both parties to offer the level of public good that corresponds to the Lindahl allocation of the economy. This means that the final allocation of resources resides on the Pareto frontier and therefore it is efficient.
Our results are interesting for two reasons. First, contrary to the results of the previous literature, which emphasizes the role of full commitment in solving issues of efficiency in political games, we show that partial commitment (in tandem with appropriate political institutions) is an important element for the existence of an efficient solution. Second, to the best of our knowledge, this is the only game with multidimensional policy space, where an equilibrium exists, it is efficient and political rents are zero.
We understand, of course, that this result is derived under some restrictive and arbitrary assumptions. The economy we consider is one of symmetric information, where the problem of the provision of public goods is easy to solve once a benevolent social planner is assumed. However, this assumption is not consistent with the central assumption of economic theory, that economic agents are selfish (Buchanan, 1959) . Instead, we focus in the case where all agents (including politicians) are selfish, in the sense that they try to extract as many resources as they can.
Parties (or alternatively politicians) are exogenous entities and this implies that any political rents they receive create inefficiencies. If politicians were agents in the economy, as in the citizen-candidate type of models, then political rents would lead to redistribution within the economy, but not to inefficiencies. But the assumption of exogenous politicians and its association with economic inefficiencies makes it easier to define political rents.
It is also true that the political institutions of the game we examine, like the restriction on maximum taxation and the commitment of political proposals, are exogenously imposed. But the main point of the paper is whether political competition can eliminate political rents and not how these institutions may emerge. In an companion paper (Boukouras and Koufopoulos, 2008) we relax the assumptions of this paper. Namely, we allow the agents of the economy to become either politicians (so who becomes politician is determined endogenously) or legislators or just voters. Legislators decide whether politicians will be committed to their proposals and in which dimensions and also about the institutional restrictions on taxation. In this context, we show that the unique sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the political game implies the restrictions we have exogenously imposed in this paper and the equilibrium allocation is the same. Hence, we endogenize all institutional features imposed exogenously in this model and we therefore provide theoretical foundations for this paper.
The argument made by Stigler (1972) and Wittman (1989) has been widely acknowledged by economists, but a formal examination of this argument requires also an examination of the issue of political commitment, due to the issue of the existence of equilibrium in multi-dimensional policy spaces. Alesina (1988) is one of the first papers to formalize both aspects of the problem. He considers an one-dimensional policy space, where agents have single-peaked preferences and political parties are not committed to their proposals. Because parties have their own political preferences, without some sort of commitment on proposals, they will adopt the most preferred policies after election and voters, anticipating this will vote for the party closest to their own bliss point. As a result the Median Voter Theorem breaks down. This problem is solved in an infinitely repeated political game, where, under a sufficiently large discount factor, parties commit to their political platforms in order to build reputation for the latter stages of the game. However, Alesina's solution would not work in our multi-dimensional policy space, because reputation considerations by parties would effectively restore full commitment of political proposals and the problem of the existence of the equilibrium would emerge again.
A more appropriate framework for solving the issue of the existence of equilibrium under multi-dimensional policy spaces is the sequential bargaining approach, adopted by Baron and Ferejohn (1989) . They do not explicitly consider political competition, but rather a bargaining procedure between legislators over the division of social surplus, which has the properties of a private good (excludable and divisible). However, their model has some elements that resemble the process of political competition, for example the fact that political proposals must be voted by a majority of the legislators. They show that the first proposer has a relative bargaining power over the rest (a result related to Rubinstein, 1982) and, as a result, he receives a greater portion of the surplus (which could be interpreted as political rents). Jackson and Moselle (2002) extend the Baron and Ferejohn framework to multidimensional settings with both private and ideological dimensions (essentially public goods). In their framework it is also true that the first proposer has a relative bargaining advantage, which allows him to extract a greater part of the surplus. Moreover, because the proposer does not internalize the externalities generated by the ideological dimension, equilibrium allocations are generally inefficient. But, as in the previous paper, entry to political competition is costly (there are strictly positive utility costs associated with waiting for one period so that another proposal is made) and therefore the implications that one can derive from it for political competition are limited.
A more direct approach is adopted by the citizen-candidate models of Osborne and Slivinsky (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997) . In these models agents are allowed to choose whether to become politicians or not (at a strictly positive cost), and agents vote for the politician they want to elect, understanding that the winner will implement his most preferred policy. Besley and Coate also discuss the normative implications of the model. They show that in equilibrium all proposals will be on the Pareto frontier and therefore political competition is efficient. However, political rents still exist in their model, since the successful candidate achieves his bliss point.
In all these papers political competition does not eliminate political rents, but no other solution to this problem is provided. In our paper, we also establish that competition among candidates is not sufficient for this purpose. At the same time we provide some political institutions which, when combined with competition, do not allow parties to extract social surplus. In addition, we show that if these institutions are not supplemented by competition, political rents arise and hence we provide an argument for its necessity.
In the next section we describe the economic environment and in the subsequent sections we explore the different equilibria outcomes of the political game under three alternative assumptions: i) appropriate political institutions of control exist (restriction on maximum taxation, partially committing proposals), but political competition does not take place, ii) political competition takes place, but the appropriate institutions of control do not exist, iii) both political competition and institutions exist. Finally, section 3 concludes the paper.
Description of the economic environment and the mechanism
Consider an economy with 2 agents and 2 goods. Good 1 is a private good while good 2 is a public good. Let e 1 and e 2 be the endowments of the private good for agents 1 and 2 respectively. Agent i = {1, 2} has a well defined ordering of preferences which can be represented by a continuous, non-decreasing, strictly quasi-concave utility function u i (x i , y), where x i represents the consumption of the private good for agent i and y represents the quantity of the public good produced. The public good is produced through a linear production function F (z) = mz, where z stands for the aggregate quantity of the private good used as input and m is a scaling coefficient.
As a benchmark case we define the allocation outcome generated by a system based on competitive markets. Each agent places an order of public good to firms so that he maximizes his utility given his endowment and the order of the other agent. Firms, facing conditions of free entry, buy inputs from agents and try to maximize their profits. Assume that k is the number of firms operating in the economy, where k is a large number. Assume, without loss of generality, that the equilibrium allocation of resources under free markets is unique and is given by:
The resulting utility level for agent 1 and 2 is v
f m be the vector of utilities, agents receive in the competitive equilibrium. Because of the nature of the public good, a f m is not Pareto efficient. There exists a feasible re-allocation of resources that can make at least one of the agents better off without making the other worse off. At the same time, we allow agents to abandon any centralized decision making system, if it offers them less utility than what they would have got if they had acted in a decentralized economy. Therefore v f m is an effective outside option, which determines the individual participation constraints on any centralized allocation scheme.
Given the economic environment, we will highlight the importance of political competition for the efficient provision of the public good. In order to do so, we will initially take the institutional constraints and political parties as exogenous (we will relax these assumptions in the subsequent section). For now, consider the following centralized decision making mechanism manifested into a voting game dictated by the rules of a Constitution. The players of the mechanism are political parties (or alternatively politicians) and the 2 agents. A political party is an exogenous entity which makes offers of prospective quantities of public good to agents and tries to be elected as government. Parties exhibit risk neutrality and their utility is the probability to win the election in the voting game times the rents they receive from their offers: V p = p win r p 4 . Agents play the double role of being the consumers of the final allocations produced in the economy and voters, who decide which party will become the government.
The Constitution is a exogenous political institution which puts restrictions on the action sets of parties and voters. More specifically, it specifies the types of political proposals that parties can make, the way agents vote and how a government is elected to implement its proposed allocation. Agents vote for the party whose proposal provides the greatest level of utility for them. If agents are indifferent between two proposals, then we assume that they vote for each one of them with equal probability. The party which receives the majority of votes, wins the election.
Party proposals consist of only one element: a quantity of public good to be produced (y p ). Let P R p = {y p } denote the political proposal of party p. If a party is elected into power, then it will be called to implement the level of public good it proposed before the election. Note, however, that, while the party has committed itself over the quantity of the public good, it has not committed itself over the taxation levels that will be imposed on agents to finance its production. The only constraint, which we assume that is imposed on the government by the Constitution, is that the taxation each individual will pay can not exceed the taxation that the same agent would have paid for the proposed level of the public good if he were on his offer curve. This is equivalent to saying that, given a specific proportion of aggregate taxation that an agent pays, the maximum taxation possible is one that gives the agent the same utility level as the one he would have obtained when the proposed level of public good was an optimal choice for the agent. For example, the maximum taxation possible for agent i for the proposed level y in Figure 1 (page 9) is equal to t i . For the rest of this paper, we will call this institutional restriction as the maximum willingness-to-pay constraint or the maximum taxation constraint.
However, on its own, this restriction is not sufficient to eliminate political rents, as we show for the case of a single party. A party that faces only this constraint can find levels of the public good for which the aggregate willingness-to-pay exceeds the required expenditure. The presence of political competition is also necessary for the elimination of rents. On the other hand, if there are more than one parties, but the Constitution does not impose the maximum willingness-to-pay constraint, then political parties can still earn political rents, despite the presence of political competition. Therefore, some form of institutional restrictions are also necessary for the efficient provision of public goods.
In order to show that political competition and institutional constraints are both necessary requirements for the efficient provision of the public good in this economy, we present the equilibrium 5 of the game under 3 different conditions: i) when the Constitution restricts party proposals and imposes the maximum willingness-to-pay, but there is only one party in the economy, ii) when there are two parties in the economy, but there is not the maximum willingness-to-pay constraint (the only constraint is the standard participation constraint) and finally iii) when both conditions (multiple parties and the maximum taxation constraint) are satisfied.
Case I
Consider, first, the case when there is only one party, which has secured the control of the government and acts as a dictator. This provides a base of comparison for political competition. The party's objective is to maximize its rents given the constitutional constraint on policies, and hence it tries to find the level of public good, for which the summation of agents net valuation is the highest. More formally, the party's maximization problem can be described as:
The party's problem is straightforward. It needs to choose a level of the public good such that both agents would like to contribute a share of their endowment as big as possible, so that political rents are maximized. The rents come from the fact that, at the proposed level of public good, aggregate taxation will be higher than the required resources for its production, so that the difference is received by the party. Below we show that, under relatively general conditions, these rents will be strictly positive.
Proposition 1: Under the assumption that u i (.) : R 2 + → R + is a continuous, nondecreasing, strictly quasi-concave function, which represents non-satiated preferences over normal goods, the maximization problem described above has at least one solution with strictly positive rents.
Proof: The party's maximization problem can be rewritten as: 
The left-hand side of equation (1) is the marginal benefit to the party by an increase in the level of the public good, while the right-hand side reflects the marginal cost. Also, notice that s m i (y) is a continuous, decreasing function of y. Because of the assumptions of non-satiation and strict quasi-concavity of the utility functions, for every level of expenditure sharing s i there exists a unique level of the public good y, such that agent i maximizes his utility. Furthermore as s i decreases the demand for the public good increases. In other words, the offer curves for both agents are decreasing functions of s i (as it is shown also in Figure 1 ). Essentially, s m i (y) is the inverse function of the offer curve and hence it is also a decreasing function of y:
∂s m i (y) ∂y < 0. First, notice that as y → 0, the left-hand side of equation (1) goes to 2, as both individuals are willing to shoulder the full burden of taxation for low level of public goods. At the same time, the right-hand side of equation (1) tends to 1, which means that the difference between the two sides is positive. On the other hand, as y → ∞, the left-hand side tends to 0, as individuals are willing to provide an infinitesimal part of their endowment for very high levels of public good, while the right-hand side tends to infinity, making the difference between the two negative. Since both sides are continuous and monotonic functions of y, there exists at least one level of public good y * such that the two sides are equal.
Second, because The intuition for this result is simple. When only one party is allowed to operate in the economy it knows that it has full bargaining power over the population since its offers will go unchallenged, so long as both agents are willing to forgo a part of their endowment for the proposed level of public good. It therefore becomes a social dictator, using its power to provide allocations that maximize its rents. Because the marginal utility of the public good is higher than the marginal rate of transformation for both agents when its quantity is very low, proposals associated with positive political rents are easy to find. Of course, all such proposals are socially inefficient, since they imply excessive supply of resources into the production process and consequently waste.
Case II
The main elements of the game are as in the first case. However, we assume that there are two parties in the economy and the maximum taxation constraint does not hold 6 . This means that parties are free to choose any taxation level after being elected in government, as long as the participation constraints are satisfied. In order to be more explicit, we present the structure of the game below:
Stage 1: Each party makes an offer on the level of public good.
Stage 2: Each agent decides which party to vote and the election takes place. The party which receives the majority of votes wins the election. In case of draw, one of the two parties is chosen randomly to implement its proposal.
Stage 3: The elected party takes over power and implements its proposal.
The removal of the maximum taxation constraint has an important implication for the equilibrium outcome. Because a party in power is not constrained over the level of taxation, political competition is rendered powerless. No matter what promises parties make in the first stage for the level of public good, the government will impose such a high level of taxation on each agent, so that he is indifferent between the market and the governmental allocation of resources. This happens because there is no effective commitment on taxation levels after the election has taken place.
Agents, anticipating this, understand that all proposals imply the same utility level for them, irrespectively of their promise over the quantity of public good. Therefore, they are indifferent between voting for one party or the other and vote randomly for one or the other. Political parties, of course, anticipate this as they realize that their commitment on the level of public good does not affect agents' voting behavior in the subsequent stage. Since the probability of winning the election is independent of its proposal for any party, the best choice for them is to commit on the level of public good that maximizes their rents after the election and simultaneously just satisfies the participation constraints of agents. In this case, parties are acting effectively as social dictators. Proposition 2 summarizes the result.
Proposition 2: The sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium outcome of the 2-agent, 2-party game, without the maximum taxation constraint enforced by the Constitution, implies strictly positive political rents for the party that is elected in government.
Proof: In stage 3, whichever party is elected will impose the maximum taxation possible. Given that there is no commitment over the level of taxation in stage one by a party's proposal and that there is no constitutional restriction, the maximum taxation is the one that makes each individual indifferent between the allocation he would obtain by competitive markets and the one implemented by the government.
In stage 2, agents are indifferent between party proposals, as all of them imply the same utility level for each individual. Therefore, their vote can not affect the final outcome of the game and they vote randomly for either party. In stage 1, parties realize that their political offer has no impact on the voting rule of agents. Their best response is to set the level of public good so as to maximize their political rents. Formally, each party solves the following problem:
From the First Order Condition we get that:
This is a simple cost-benefit equation. It states that the party should offer a level of the public good such that for the last unit of it, the marginal benefit of the extra taxation is equal to the marginal cost of the extra resources required for its production. Let y denote this level of public good. Also, from the total derivative of the participation constraint notice that:
This also implies that the summation of the ratio of marginal utilities is strictly greater than the marginal rate of transformation for all y < y:
The level of public good proposed by parties, provides them with strictly positive political rents. This is an important result. It shows that political competition on its own is not a sufficient condition for the elimination of political rents. Institutional restrictions are also necessary, a point that we will emphasize also in the next case. In fact, without the maximum taxation constraint, political parties can implement perfect price discrimination in the third stage of the game, so that the political rents for the ruling party will be at least as large the ones of the social dictator in case I, under any combination of individual preferences and endowments. This is because political competition is powerless if there are no restrictions on the maximum level of taxation and as a result parties face one less constraint than the sole party of the previous case. Once the maximum taxation constraint is reinstated, however, political competition leads to efficiency, as shown below.
Case III
The primitives of the economy and the political game remain the same as in the previous case, with the difference that the two parties in the economy face the maximum taxation constraint. An immediate consequence of competition is that parties can not secure election victory by simply satisfying agents' willingness-to-pay, as was the case with a single party. In fact political rents will be zero in equilibrium, irrespectively of the offer that will pass.
Proposition 3: Assume that the original economy has a unique Lindahl equilibrium. The political game as described above, with 2 agents, 2 parties and the Constitution as described in the previous section, has a unique sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. Both parties propose the level of public good that corresponds to the Lindahl allocation of the economy. Both agents are indifferent and vote randomly for either party. In the third stage, the party which receives most votes becomes the government, otherwise one party is selected randomly to implement the common proposal.
Proof: For the sake of simplicity, we assume for now that the Lindahl allocation is unique, but we will relax this assumption subsequently. Let
be the quantity of public good and the respective expenditure shares associated with the Lindahl allocation of this economy. By definition, s
In the last stage of the game, the party that wins the election will maximize its rents given the commitment it has undertaken in stage 1 regarding the level of public good. The implication of this is that agents will be asked to contribute their maximum willingness-to-pay in stage 3. If a party has offered y L , then it can not extract any political rents after election, since the maximum willingness-to-pay of the agents is exactly the same as the expenditure required for the public good. To see that, recall from the previous section that s m i (y) (the maximum willingness-to-pay of agent i) is a decreasing function of y and that the Lindahl allocation is defined as a sharing of the public good expenditure such that both agents agree on the demanded quantity. This means that s 
y) < 1. If a party ever offered y p > y L , then agents would anticipate that such a level of public good can not be implemented without violating their maximum willingness-topay and hence they would not vote for the corresponding party. On the other hand, if party p offers y p < y L , then agents, as we noted in the previous paragraph, anticipate strictly positive political rents for the party. Furthermore, both agents would be strictly better off by an offer with a greater level of public good. This is because levels of y closer to the Lindahl allocation correspond to points on the offer curves with higher utility (See also Figure 1) . Therefore, if party p offers y p = y L , then the other party will lose the election with certainty if it makes any other offer. If party p offers y p < y L , then the other party can win the election with certainty by offering a quantity of public good slightly greater. Finally, any offer y p > y L is not credible, and party q can win with certainty by making any offer with y q y L . As a result, the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium involves both parties proposing y = y L . The rest of the proposition follows immediately. The main intuition of the proposition is that, when competition is allowed, then parties can not maximize their political rents without taking into account the offers of their contestants. Since agents anticipate that parties can commit to the level of the public good, but not to the tax level, they will vote the proposal which minimizes rents. Note that Lindahl allocations are the only credible allocations on the Pareto frontier. Political contesters understand this and make efficient offers. The resulting equilibrium of the game is represented diagrammatically in Figure 2 . The level of public good y m corresponds to the choice that a monopolistic party would do. Such a level implies strictly positive political rents for the government, as the summation of the maximum willingness-to-pay of the two individuals exceeds one. On the other hand, y L is the level of public good that is obtained under conditions of political competition and it corresponds to the level of public good under the Lindahl allocation L 7 . It is, also, noteworthy that in the case where there exists a unique Lindahl allocation in the economy, the Constitutional constraints allow unanimous social choice to arise endogenously.
Conclusion
The contribution of this paper is twofold: i) we show that a Nash equilibrium exists under deterministic voting in a multi-dimensional policy setting, ii) we show that political competition is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the elimination of political rents. The existence of the equilibrium is due to the assumption that politi-cians commit to the level of the public good, but not to the taxation level. Although this assumption guarantees the existence of the equilibrium, the resulting equilibrium is inefficient (implies inefficiently low level of the public good). To address this problem, we also impose the maximum taxation constraint. Thus, the existence and efficiency (elimination of political rents) of the equilibrium is the outcome of the combination of political proposals committing to the level of the public good, but not to the taxation level, along with the maximum taxation constraint that provides the additional institutional requirements. Of course, without political competition, this result does not obtain either.
Our results are interesting for two reasons. First, we show that partial commitment (along with appropriate political institutions) is an important element for the existence of an efficient solution. This result is different from the findings of the previous literature, which emphasize the role of full commitment. Second, to the best of our knowledge, this is the only game with multi-dimensional policy space, where an equilibrium exists, it is efficient and political rents are zero.
We understand that exogenously imposing the institutions needed for our results is not satisfactory. In order to address this issue, in a closely related paper (Boukouras and Koufopoulos, 2008) , we allow the agents themselves to become politicians and propose allocations or legislators and design institutions, which restrict the actions of voters and politicians. Hence, we endogenously derive the institutions we just assumed in this paper and we provide theoretical foundations for their emergence. We also show that separation of powers can emerge endogenously. Our plan for future work in this area is to extend our model to cases of multiple public goods and asymmetric information.
